Four Fridays for Corruption: The Political Economy of Corruption

Virtual workshop - Zoom

This online workshop series aims to bring together researchers from different disciplines to improve our theoretical, empirical and methodological understanding of different aspects of corruption, rent-seeking behaviours, and informal practices within different institutional contexts.

Friday 1: The Political Economy of Corruption

About the event

A general consensus exists that corruption and other forms of rent-seeking behaviour impose tremendous costs on society, because they reduce funds devoted to public goods including safety, social services, and infrastructure. They create economic distortions, lower economic growth, and increase inequality. From the institutional perspective, institutions – as rules and norms able to constrain and shape human interactions (Hodgson 2006; North, 1990) – should minimise these collective action problems by discouraging and penalising rent-seeking behaviours. Within the literature on individuals’ conformity and compliance to rules (broadly defined as social norms), emphasis has been placed on the study of the reasons why institutions designed to contain such behaviours fail to act as expected (Batory 2012). Across different social science disciplines a consensus is emerging that corruption and other forms of rent-seeking behaviours cannot be reduced to a lack of institutional quality.

This workshop aims to provide an ad-hoc research platform to further this debate. We are interested in work that sheds light on corruption and other forms of rent-seeking behaviours within different institutional and socio-cultural contexts from a broad and interdisciplinary perspective. The workshop also aims to explore different aspects of informality, the complementarities existing between informal practices and different forms of institutions, and the relational mechanisms linking informal practices and corruption.

Once you have signed up, you will receive a Zoom link a few days before the event.

Event Programme

Dorottya Sallai, London School of Economics

Jozsef Martin, Corvinus University Budapest

Institutions as Agents of Systemic corruption and Rent- seeking

Mogens Justesen, Copenhagen Business School

Luigi Manzetti, Southern Methodist University

Poverty, Partisanship, and Vote Buying

Giovanna Rodriguez-Garcia, Center for Research and Teaching in Economics, Mexico

Party System Nationalization Promoting Accountability to Curb Corruption

 

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